The concept of vulnerability is frequently invoked in social discourses. For example, governments urge people to observe strict COVID lockdown measures to protect the vulnerable. Health experts and activists argue that abortion restrictions will hurt the most vulnerable populations.
Yet what is vulnerability, indeed? And why is it so morally significant? I invite you to read Chapter 1 of “Vulnerability: new essays in ethics and feminist philosophy,” which is an excellent overview of the theorization of vulnerability. I also attached Chapter 5, which discusses the entwinement of autonomy and vulnerability. I will go over the content of Chapter 1 in the first 25 minutes, and I want to hear how Chapter 1 changes your view of vulnerability. I also hope to have a discussion on how a better understanding of vulnerability may impact FATE (fairness, accountability, transparency, ethics) research.
Both articles can be found in the Box folder.
Mackenzie, C., Rogers, W., & Dodds, S. (2014). Introduction: What is vulnerability, and why does it matter for moral theory? In C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers, & S. Dodds (Eds.), Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (pp. 1–19). Oxford University Press.
Anderson, J. (2014). Autonomy and vulnerability entwined. In C. Mackenzie, W. Rogers, & S. Dodds (Eds.), Vulnerability: New essays in ethics and feminist philosophy (pp. 134–161). Oxford University Press.
This event is sponsored by Conceptual Foundations Group